近日，北京大学经济学院助理教授曹光宇、北京大学光华管理学院教授翁翕、香港大学经济及工商管理学院博士后研究员徐铭威、北京大学光华管理学院教授周黎安的合作论文“How Do Bureaucrats Respond to Hybrid Incentive Contract? Evidence from China’s Air Pollution Controls”在公共经济学领域顶级期刊 Journal of Public Economics 上正式发表。

# 论文简介 #

Title：

How Do Bureaucrats Respond to Hybrid Incentive Contract? Evidence from China’s Air Pollution Controls

Author：

Guangyu Cao, Xi Weng, Mingwei Xu, Li-An Zhou

Abstract：
This paper investigates how local bureaucrats in China respond to minimum targets for air pollution control, which are part of a hybrid incentive contract that simultaneously specifies high-powered incentives for economic growth. Using a novel prefecture-day level dataset on air quality and applying a Regression Discontinuity Design, we find strong evidence that air quality tends to improve when the air quality target is doomed to fail, but deteriorates significantly once early fulfillment of the target is secured. We develop a theoretical model to rationalize these findings and highlight the role of uncertainty faced by local bureaucrats in shaping their responses. Further analyses explore how local economic pressure, the punishment loss for failing to meet the target, regional differences, and political turnovers affect bureaucratic strategic behavior after the target completion status becomes known. This study sheds light on how hybrid incentive contracts function in a multitasking context.

标题： 

官员如何应对混合激励契约？来自中国空气污染治理的证据

中文摘要：

本文探讨了中国地方官僚在空气污染治理最低目标下的行为响应。这些最低目标是混合激励契约的组成部分，该契约同时为经济增长提供了高能激励。基于地级市—日度的新型空气质量数据集，并采用断点回归设计，本文发现了强有力的证据：当空气质量目标注定无法达成时，空气质量往往会改善；而一旦提前锁定目标完成，空气质量则会显著恶化。我们构建了一个理论模型来解释上述发现，并强调地方官僚面临的不确定性在塑造其行为反应中的关键作用。进一步分析考察了地方经济压力、目标未达成的惩罚损失、区域差异以及政治更替如何影响官僚在目标完成状态明晰后的策略性行为。本研究揭示了混合激励契约在多任务情境下的运作机制。